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FOREWORD
Conflict and wars destroy basic infrastructure and disrupt public services (health,
education, power, water, and sanitation), creating humanitarian crises and a lack of
confidence and legitimacy in the reigning government. The inability of these states
to provide the most basic services and enable economic activity to earn livelihoods
immediately translates into a new role for stability operations. In permissive and even
in semi-permissive environments, humanitarian organizations are often able to take
the lead in meeting basic human needs for food, shelter, and health. In nonpermissive
environments, the military must frequently assist the host country with humanitarian
operations as well as help reconstruct the physical and institutional infrastructure to
restore basic public services and economic activity.
In this guide, the authors provide a set of principles and operational guidelines for
peacekeepers to help the country restore public infrastructure and services. The extent
to which public sector reconstruction takes place is a function of the mission, the level
of resources, expertise of the troops, and the host country context. The guide provides
courses of action to both planners and practitioners in executing these operations and
supplements existing and emerging documents. The material here draws from both
theoretical and analytical frameworks as well as from the experience and lessons learned
from practitioners.
While the guide is designed to provide peacekeepers with a thorough and nuanced
understanding on the policy, planning, cultural and ethnic implications, tradeoffs, and
options for public services reconstruction, it takes the position ultimately that the host
government is responsible for public goods. Stability actors and host country governments
can cooperate on policy, resource allocation, and service planning, even when the majority
of services may initially be provided by nonstate or external actors, but the host country
is in the lead. Issues addressed include control of corruption, administration of public
services, policy, resource allocation and joint budgeting for restoration, reconstruction,
and maintenance. Immediately after a conflict, the flight of skilled professionals may have
left little capacity for public services restoration, making it a critical priority to rebuild
capacity in engineering, planning, budgeting, and maintenance as well as to reestablish
the revenue generation to sustain these services. The role for stability actors is broad
and critical in this effort, as they seek to restore the ability of a government to meet the
expectations of its citizens and restore legitimacy and stability to a nation.

JOHN A. KARDOS
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director
Peacekeeping and Stability
Operations Institute

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
The Army’s stability operations manual, Field Manual (FM) 3-07, identifies five sectors
as components of an integrated approach to stability and reconstruction (S&R): security,
justice and reconciliation, humanitarian assistance and social well-being, participatory
governance, and economic recovery and stabilization.
FM 3-07 describes two categories of the range of activities in stability operations for
achieving these end state conditions: reconstruction and stabilization.
Reconstruction is the process of rebuilding degraded, damaged, or destroyed political,
socioeconomic, and physical infrastructure to create the foundation for long-term development.
Stabilization is the process by which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in violence
and a breakdown in law and order are managed and reduced, while efforts are made to support
preconditions for successful long-term development.

This guide examines the role of restoration of public services within the broader context
of stability operations. The extent to which public service reconstruction takes place
depends on the mission, the level of resources, and the host country context.
This paper provides guidance helpful to U.S. peacekeeping personnel in planning
and executing stability operations tasks related to restoration of public sector services
and infrastructure. It is designed to supplement existing and emerging guidance, and is
specifically relevant to addressing the needs of public sector rebuilding in a post-conflict
situation by peacekeeping forces. The material presented here draws both from theory
and analytic frameworks and from on-the-ground experience of practitioners.
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GUIDE TO REBUILDING PUBLIC SECTOR SERVICES
IN STABILITY OPERATIONS:
A ROLE FOR THE MILITARY
Many stability operations tasks are best performed by indigenous, foreign, or US civilian
professionals. Nonetheless, U.S. military forces should be prepared to perform all tasks necessary
to establish or maintain order when civilians cannot do so. Successfully performing such tasks can
help secure a lasting peace and facilitate the timely withdrawal of U.S. and foreign forces. Stability
operations tasks include helping . . . develop representative government institutions.
		

DoD 3000.05, November 25, 2005

INTRODUCTION
Conflict and wars destroy basic infrastructure, disrupt the delivery of core services
(e.g., health, education, electricity, water, and sanitation), and impede the day-to-day
routines associated with making a living. The inability of fragile and post-conflict states
to provide fundamental public goods and services has impacts on the immediate tasks
facing stability operations. In permissive environments, humanitarian nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) often take the lead in meeting citizens’ basic needs in the absence
of state capacity. In nonpermissive situations, military forces generally play a role
in providing basic services directly and/or providing protection to NGOs, while also
engaging in offensive and defensive kinetic operations. However, the danger in this
combination of functions is that insurgent forces may then regard these military-provided
services and the NGOs as legitimate targets for attack.
While reliance on external actors may be a necessity early in stability operations,
ultimately the capacity of the public sector in the conflict-affected country must be rebuilt
or created to take the lead in providing public goods and services. Effective service
provision is associated with a functioning civil service, basic budgeting and management
systems, control of corruption, adequate municipal infrastructure, availability of health
care and schooling, provision of roads and transportation networks, and (eventually)
attention to social safety nets. The following sections in this guide cover the “nuts and
bolts” of these components.
The general point made here is that stability and reconstruction (S&R) actors need
to look for ways to foster the capacity of the government earlier rather than later in
stability operations. Stability actors and host country governments can cooperate on
policy, resource allocation, and service planning, even when the majority of services
are delivered by nonstate providers. S&R actors can constructively align their capacitybuilding support, whether at national or subnational levels, with public-sector agencies
to:
• Capitalize on existing sources of capacity (even if nascent or limited) as starting
points to visibly demonstrate coordination,
• Undertake joint planning and budgeting exercises with public officials to build
their capacities in these areas, and
• Structure service provision contracts with international NGOs and contractors
to create incentives for local capacity building and partnership with government
actors.
1

The hand-off from international NGOs and contractors to host country governments
becomes harder the longer the two sets of actors proceed down parallel tracks. In most
countries, effective basic services depend on more than government; the capacity of the
private sector and civil society is also critical to rebuild. While a given failed state has
very weak or no service delivery capacity at all, it is likely that even in dire situations
some “pockets of productivity” exist that can serve as building blocks for interim
governments and their international partners (see Box 1).1
Box 1. Restoring Services and Rebuilding Legitimacy.
Coalition forces in Al-Basrah were confronted with Iraqi citizens pressing them for the restoration of
electricity, water, and sewerage. Post-conflict Iraq in 2003 had weak local administrative capacity, and
extensive sabotage and looting following the war had incapacitated local service-delivery departments
and destroyed most of their assets. The military turned to civilian contractors with the USAID Local
Governance Program (LGP) for assistance. LGP worked with local departments to assess needs, develop
a list of necessary parts and equipment, and prepare an action plan for restoration of services. With rapid
response grants, and the introduction of competitive tendering coupled with transparent oversight, LGP
helped the Al-Basrah municipal service departments to make emergency repairs and restore basic
operations. The engagement of local staff and reliance on local talent, coupled with the introduction of
transparency and accountability, gave credibility to the municipal departments and strengthened the
legitimacy of Al-Basrah officials. Community residents volunteered to protect the restored service
delivery assets from sabotage. Neighboring provinces emulated the practices employed in Al-Basrah.2

Beyond service provision, economic opportunity is a core public good, and getting
the economy going following conflict is important for stability operations.3 Effectiveness here involves employment generation, sound macroeconomic and fiscal policymaking, efficient budgeting, promotion of equitably distributed wealth creating
investment opportunities, and an adequate regulatory framework. Failing and failed
states generally exhibit the opposite: policies that privilege powerful elites, few budget
controls, a thriving black market, and rampant corruption and cronyism. Moreover,
patronage arrangements often keep opportunity in the hands of elites and siphon off
public assets for private gain while a combination of punitive use of existing regulations
and exemptions benefit the favored few.
Service delivery and economic development are central elements to the “social
contract” between the state and its citizens. They contribute directly to legitimacy in
that citizens will cease to support governments that cannot or will not provide basic
services, limit corrupt practices, and generate economic opportunity. Particularly when
coupled with ethnic tensions, weak states’ inability/unwillingness to do so can be an
important contributing factor to ongoing fragility and the eruption of renewed conflict.
This area of governance also connects to security. If youth are in school, job
opportunities are available, families have hope that their well-being will improve, and
citizens (including demobilized combatants) are less likely to engage in crime or be
recruited into insurgency.
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EFFECTIVE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS AND SERVICES
Failure to meet citizens’ expectations that government provide public goods and
services effectively and efficiently can be a cause or a consequence of conflict, civil
disorder, or tensions that may lead to open disorder and violence. Groups within a society
that feel deprived of basic services while elites are well-served may become insurgents
or criminals. A larger-scale failure of government to deliver services that affects even
many elites may cause a government to collapse or be deposed. A new government that
replaces a discredited previous regime may lose its support if it is perceived as too slow
in rebuilding or restoring basic services.
Public goods and services include:
• Routine basic public services such as water and sanitation, health, education, etc.;
• Long-term economic and social development planning including public sector
capital investments in infrastructure and its financing;
• Economic goods and services that are considered a public, rather than private,
sector responsibility.
In each of the above, the perspective is from the host country in which stability operations
take place. That is, basic public services are those that the country considers a public
sector responsibility. Similarly, economic goods are those that are considered public in
the host country. Economic lines of operations (as opposed to rebuilding or restoring
government) in stability operations involve activities with the private sector and are not
covered in this guide. The focus here is on governmental institutions and their interaction
with citizens and the private sector.
Interventions aimed at effective and efficient public services provision will occur in all
phases from the final phases of conflict to reconstruction to stabilization. Reconstruction
efforts aim at rebuilding degraded or destroyed public services. As public services are
restored, stabilization efforts aim at establishing preconditions for successful long-term,
sustainable development. The following discussion of effective provision of public goods
and services addresses planning for and conduct of stability operations in both the
reconstruction and stabilization phases.4
Planning for Public Service Restoration.
In stability operations planning, the first task in addressing issues of effective public
goods and services provision is to identify what services are deemed public in the host
country. Identifying what is and what is not considered public does not imply that stability
operations will or should always focus only on services that the particular host country
considers a public sector responsibility. In emergency and humanitarian operations,
basic needs for food, shelter, disease treatment and prevention, etc., are met regardless
of the government’s normal role in the affected society in addressing those issues. But
when emergency relief is no longer necessary for purposes of rebuilding or restoring
governance, stability operations should mainly focus on services in which government is
expected to play a significant role.
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In the planning phase, in addition to considering the extant definition of governmental
responsibilities in the specific country, other considerations for rebuilding government
include the extent to which:
• Public infrastructure will be rebuilt versus more modest rehabilitation and repair
interventions.
• Stability operations will include significant public sector management capacity
building, introduction of technical management improvements in public goods,
and services provision.
• Stability operations, depending on country context, will include significant
policy dialogue to encourage the host country to contract or expand the scope of
government in the society and in the economy.
Societies differ from each other in what is considered a public sector service provision
responsibility and what is left to the individual, or family, or tribes and clans, or other
social groupings. In addition, what is considered a public sector responsibility and what is
not considered public changes over time. These differences are based in part on tradition;
in part on cultural expectations about the respective roles of the individual, families,
social and/or tribal affiliations, community-based organizations, and officially organized
government; and in part on the stage of economic development.
In conflict-prone countries, the public sector has a relatively weak capacity to provide
public goods and services effectively and efficiently. Many issues such as preschool
education, assistance to the very poor, and other social issues are left to individuals or
NGOs. At the other end of the economic spectrum, in advanced economies there is often
greater reliance on the private sector for what may have been considered at one time public
responsibilities. For example, water utilities are virtually completely privatized in several
industrial economies. However, in many middle-income and developing countries, the
public sector typically plays a substantial role in services provision.
In the stabilization phase of stability operations—establishing the preconditions
for successful long-term development—there is scope for policy engagement with the
host country about what are public sector responsibilities and the potential for greater
involvement of the private sector in aspects of public services provision. Local government
contracting out for solid waste collection and disposal, for example, is frequently an
efficient way for the public sector to provide that service. However, where governmental
institutions are very weak, as is typical in most post-conflict situations, a government may
not be able to protect the public interest in managing private sector contractors in longerterm concession contracts where the government transfers responsibility to a contractor
to provide a public service.
There also are key differences in the role of government in planning and in managing
long-term economic and social development. In countries where stability operations are
most likely, broad national strategy for allocating basic economic resources is guided
typically by a multiyear national development plan. In cases such as Iraq and Afghanistan,
national development plans are a central focus of multinational agreements expressing
the political, economic, and social commitments of the two countries in return for U.S.
commitments, multilateral institutions such as the United Nations (UN) and the World
Bank, and other individual countries. These agreements are formalized in the Compact
with Iraq and the Compact with Afghanistan.
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With these caveats, the following services are more often public sector responsibilities
in the settings in which stability operations are conducted and are thus the most likely to
have to be addressed in both reconstruction and stabilization activities:
• Water,
• Sewerage/drainage,
• Solid waste collection and disposal,
• Electricity,
• Streets and roads,
• Flood control,
• Elementary and secondary education, particularly facilities and supplies,
• Public health clinics, particularly facilities and supplies,
• Recreational facilities such as community centers, football pitches, and parks,
• Telecommunications, particularly telephone,
• Markets,
• Public transportation,
• Public heating in countries with severe winters,
• Safety.
This is a larger list than would typically apply in stability operations, except perhaps
in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan where U.S. (and other external parties’)
intervention is very large and encompasses the whole society. Field Manual (FM) 3-07
notes that the more likely core activities among those above are sewage, water, electricity,
academics (schools), trash, medical (hospitals and clinics), and safety (law enforcement
and fire protection).5 This section will address much of the list above, with the exception
of safety.
Government also may be involved in far more sectors. Economic activities such
as airlines, cement factories, and slaughterhouses may be carried out by state-owned
enterprises. Government or government acting in the name of the people constitutionally
may be the owner of natural resources. In the constitution of Iraq, oil is identified as
owned by the people of Iraq. The constitution specifies the roles and responsibilities of the
central and lower level governments in exploiting this natural resource formally owned
by the people. Likewise, water is considered a natural resource that is the property of the
people, to be exploited and protected through assignment of various responsibilities to
central, regional, and provincial government.
The effective provision of public goods and services is divided into three main
topics:
1. Basic or routine public services provision and management;
2. Long-term development planning, infrastructure investment planning and
financing; and,
3. Government’s management and support to economic growth, taxation, and
regulation.
Basic services provision focuses mainly on routine services provision, management,
budgeting, and operations and maintenance issues. Long-term planning and investment
focuses on both economic and social development planning and capital investment
5

and financing for infrastructure facilities. The third section focuses on the public sector
role in supporting and stimulating economic growth. Each topic discussion focuses on
the key issues, trade-offs faced in addressing those issues in stability operations, and
recommended options and strategies for addressing the issues and trade-offs.
PUBLIC SERVICES PROVISION AND MANAGEMENT
Routine or current services provision is treated separately from longer-term
development planning, infrastructure planning, and investment. Of course, the two are
intertwined as planning for financing and implementing public sector infrastructure
projects is the basic hardware of routine services provision. However, there is a tendency
in reconstruction planning and execution and even in long-term development planning
to focus most of the attention on large-scale infrastructure projects, to the neglect of
repair and rehabilitation and improving the management and operation of existing,
often small-scale, public sector infrastructure. In this first subsection, attention to repair
and rehabilitation, improvement of ongoing operation and maintenance, and improved
public sector budgeting and performance measurement of routine services is the focus.
Key Issues.
Five sets of issues relate to public services provision and are discussed here. Each
set is pertinent to routine services provision, long-term planning and investment, and
economic goods and services:
1. Quantity/coverage issues,
2. Quality issues,
3. Neglected maintenance issues,
4. Sector organization and policy issues, and
5. Management and human capacity issues.
These issues overlap in that some may be the consequences and some more the causes of
poor or failed service delivery. For example, neighborhoods may be underserved by the
water distribution network (a coverage or quantity of service issue) because of years of
neglected routine maintenance and repair of network lines or lack of a water distribution
network. Or quantity and quality issues may result from basic policy weaknesses such
as an overemphasis in the public sector budget on prestige, advanced services such as
overbuilding sophisticated hospitals while neglecting public health clinics. In the latter
stages of conflict and in the post-conflict period, the most critical path to restoring or
improving services likely must first address the symptom—inadequate services delivery
to large segments of the population—in order to reduce tensions. Attention to the
underlying causes, such as inefficient policies or weak human capacity to manage, need
to come later. In those cases, the actions taken to address directly inadequate services
should avoid implicitly or explicitly supporting policies or practices that discourage
subsequent policy reforms. For example, if the situation prior to the onset of operations
was an autocracy that used central dominance to favor a few and suppress many, then,
while addressing services delivery deficits initially, stability operations should not
6

strengthen institutions that encourage, even implicitly, a continuation of past policies
that contributed to conflict. Box 2 illustrates the kind of policy and structural changes that
can address such conflict drivers.
Box 2. Conflict Over Resource Exploitation in Indonesia.
One of the major contributors to tension and sometimes outright conflict in Indonesia during the
Suharto dictatorship was the dominance of the island of Java, and even to a significant degree the Javanese, in both politics and the exploitation of the country’s considerable mineral, petroleum and forest
resources. Outlying provinces, where much of the natural resource wealth is located, felt that they were
neglected in terms of public sector resource allocations, while “their” resources located in their regions
were exploited by central authorities in Jakarta. The successive democratically elected governments after the overthrow of that regime have had to deal with both the reality and the perceptions. Among the
significant policy changes gradually implemented since the Suharto regime have been decentralization
reforms to include local election of executive and legislative officials, as opposed to appointment by the
central government in Jakarta, and more extensive resource sharing across the provinces.

Quantity Issues.
Inadequate quantity of services may be the proximate causal link between public
services provision problems and tensions that may lead to conflict. For example, flareups have occurred in Kosovo from time to time over issues of real or perceived neglect of
basic city services in municipalities where the Serbian minority is concentrated.
For water, electricity, sewerage, and telephone service, the measure of coverage is
delivery to the household (dwelling unit). What is the (1) percent of the population
overall (nationally, within a region, within a city, within a neighborhood), and (2) number
and percentage of the dwelling units or residents connected to or receiving the service?
The less economically developed the society, the more likely it is that one or more of
these household level services actually will be delivered not to the residence but to the
neighborhood. Standpipes in each neighborhood may be the expected and only available
water service. Neighborhood toilets and washing facilities may be the level of service
typical of the area or of most areas outside densely populated and generally better served
urban areas. In fragile states such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), basic
services are seriously deficient even in the capital and towns, and virtually nonexistent
elsewhere.
For services such as solid waste collection, elementary schools, public health clinics,
recreational facilities, and markets, the measure of coverage or quantity from the
beneficiary’s point of view may be the distance from residence to the service point. And for
services discussed in the previous paragraph that are delivered only at the neighborhood
level, then distance from residence to the service point is the basic quantity measure.
Neighborhood solid waste disposal units that do not require much distance traveled
to dispose of household solid wastes in most lower-income societies, or rural areas of
more economically advanced societies, are considered adequate services. The longer the
distance required to travel to dispose of waste, or for young children to get to elementary
school, or for families to get to a primary care health clinic, or to reach public toilets
or standpipes, the less favorable the attitudes are likely to be regarding the adequacy/
quantity of public services.
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For services such as streets, roads, and footpaths, the quantity measure is the distance
traveled, for example, on a footpath to reach a road where one might obtain public
transport services. Or the distance traveled on a meandering road winding among
neighborhoods before reaching a larger artery that one might have to use to reach jobs,
markets, public service facilities, and entertainment may affect the perception of the
adequacy or the quantity of a service. For public transport systems, the quantity measure
may be frequency of service on routes and hours of service. Time required to travel from
point A to point B (residential village to work in nearby town) captures the notion of
quantity of service. In restoring services of this type, it is important to consider the best
way to remove obstacles to travel from neighborhoods to jobs, to markets, and to other
locations.
There are no universal standards of what is an adequate quantity or level of service
for most services. Also it is highly unlikely that central or local government agencies are
adequately measuring quantity and certainly not to engage with citizens on setting goals
for improved quantity. For early stage stability operations, stability operations personnel
will rely on observation; some direct measurement; and discussions with community
leaders, government officials, and ideally casual discussions with citizens to judge the
perception of adequacy. Formal surveys of citizen satisfaction, such as the Iraq Local
Governance Program’s Quality of Life surveys taken in 2003 and 2004, are useful if the
scale of operations permits (see Box 3).6
Box 3. Citizen Satisfaction with Services.
In the Iraq Quality of Life surveys, citizens were asked questions to elicit their familiarity with
service delivery issues and to rate the adequacy as well as importance of these public services in their
daily lives. The surveys also asked citizens to indicate the relative importance of various figures such
as government officials, religious leaders, tribal leaders, family, and so forth as opinion leaders and as
potential official leaders. The surveys helped inform the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID) and Coalition Provincial Authority (CPA) in assessing the current state of public opinion as
well as informing staff implementing the Local Governance Program in designing interventions to
strengthen the nascent local governments’ ability to address some of the key issues.

Water and sanitation related services are an exception to formal standardization of
adequate quantity. The UN Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) estimates that
humans need an average of 5 liters (approximately 1.3 gallons) per day for drinking and
cooking and 25 liters (approximately 7 gallons) per day for personal cleanliness.7 Measures
associated with other services relate more to human behavior and process characteristics,
such as providing solid waste management staff involved in the service delivery with
adequate protective clothing. Such measures are important, but are not as pertinent to
issues that may give rise to conflict.
Regardless of the actual quantity of services delivered, the concept of adequacy of
service is a function not of comparison with a universal or scientific standard, but of the
perception of whether a service is provided in sufficient quantity. And the perception of
adequacy of service is affected by how much, if any, citizens have to pay to receive or
have access to the service. Adequacy is potentially an issue related to conflict, or tensions
8

that might lead to conflict in one or some combination of three circumstances:
1. Services have previously been more substantial, have deteriorated in quantity, and
service levels have not been restored to previous levels.
2. Services are, or are perceived to be, differentially available to different geographic
areas, different ethnic groups, different religious affiliations, or other defined groups,
and made available across groups in a discriminatory pattern by authorities.
3. While the quantity of service has not deteriorated, the price that has to be paid to
access the service has increased.
In the event of a natural calamity or conflict that has degraded or destroyed public
services, the cause of further conflict is not likely to be that services are no longer available or
available in less quantity, but the length of time it takes public authority to restore services
or return them to previous levels. Public opinion polls in Iraq immediately following the
downfall of the regime showed public services availability to be a problem, but not one
of crisis proportions. The longer it took to restore services to prewar levels, the greater
the hostility toward public authority, both during the occupation period and during
subsequent Iraqi governments. In Aceh Province, Indonesia, the perception following the
2004 tsunami was that emergency needs were addressed rapidly, and longer-term basic
services restoration was reasonably well-managed. Though many factors influenced
citizens’ perceptions in Aceh, improved and even-handed service delivery improvement
contributed to lessening tensions. Public perceptions go a long way in either contributing
to or lessening tensions (see Box 4). A contrary example also comes from Indonesia. The
government’s raising of the heavily subsidized price of the fuel used by becaks (threewheel taxis)—one of the basic transport options for the urban poor—has on numerous
occasions set off public demonstrations, some of which led to days of prolonged violence.
Banning becaks altogether in some municipal zones because of their contribution to air
pollution also has led to tensions and sometimes violence.
Box 4. Basra Water System.
In Iraq, the Basra water system in May 2003 was functioning at about pre-war quantity levels. But
water clarity was considerably poorer, and in some sections of the city improperly treated for bacteria
and other substances in the raw water. One diagnosis surfaced the need for substantial rehabilitation
of a water treatment plant. Another diagnosis revealed that the personnel had no water quality monitoring instruments and insufficient quantities of filter material to remove sediment. Personnel were
overtreating, using chemicals faster than necessary. Spare parts for small scale repairs to treatment
equipment were not on hand. A quick fix was financial assistance to purchase supplies, monitoring
equipment and spare parts, and repairs were made by departmental personnel themselves. It did not
address long-standing leakage problems in the system or longer-run issues of coverage of additional
population, but it did produce an immediate positive response from citizens who were able to see direct improvement in water clarity.

The most likely source of hostility toward a regime deriving from citizens’ perceptions
of service quantity available is the conclusion that the regime is deliberately withholding
levels of service for some segments of the population while providing substantial
services, often at subsidized prices, to favored societal groups. For example, often-voiced
complaints in the Basra area of Iraq have been that the region’s oil was exploited by the
9

previous regime to enrich others (Sunnis, Saddam Hussein’s cronies, Baghdad, etc.) and
citizens of the region around Basra were left mainly with the environmental damages of
exploiting the oil wealth without any benefits in the form of improved service.
In Afghanistan, most public services outside the few urban centers are sparse to
nonexistent. This is not the result of war damages, but is more a reflection of the overall
level of poverty and the inability of the current government as well as previous ones to
provide public services. As a result, the adequacy of services issue is one that is more akin
to central authority being perceived as irrelevant by villages and rural areas because it
has never provided any public service and is unlikely to in the future. It is not so much
that a service has been withheld, but rather that it has never been available in the first
place. Thus local residents have little reason to support a distant government that has few
benefits to offer. Their experience with public officialdom may be limited to police and
tax collectors, further reinforcing a negative view of the state.
Delivering basic public services such as health and education which previously were
nonexistent is a well-recognized step toward increasing government’s legitimacy in the
eyes of citizens and contributing to a reduced probability of future conflict. Of course,
the options are almost unlimited in areas where very few, if any, public services have
ever been provided. Even without formal random sample survey methods, such as the
Iraq Quality of Life surveys described above, stability and reconstruction (S&R) personnel
must quickly gather local impressions of priorities rather than enter the situation with
preconceived notions of what are the most important service deficits. In Iraq, for example,
after security, education, and health issues were seen as the most important by citizens,
whereas the reconstruction program assumed that electricity would be considered the
most important. For Iraqis, getting children back in school and having access to basic
health services for children were higher on the initial list of priorities than electricity.
In cases where there is a major international presence and the population perceives
that it is international actors rather than host country authorities that have assumed
responsibility for services provision, the expectations may be raised above what might
have been considered acceptable in the previous regime. Failure to rapidly improve
services on the part of the international party/parties may cause some transfer of hostile
perceptions from the host country authorities to the international stability operation.
Quality Issues.
Quantity and quality issues are similar and overlap considerably. Citizens may not
make a fine distinction between quantity and quality, and scholars might debate whether
something is considered a quantity or quality issue. For example, since there is a public
health standard for what constitutes the necessary quantity of water for drinking, cooking,
and washing, some might argue that the health consequences of inadequate access to fresh
water are more of a quality than a quantity issue. For purposes of examining trade-offs
and identifying programming options, it is moot whether to consider an issue quantity
or quality.
The difference is important when the service provided is perceived as of poor quality,
less than needed, less than deserved, or, worse, damaging. For example, a household
may be connected to public water supply or electricity, but the service is available on an
irregular basis. Electricity that is available for only 4 hours a day but on a well-known
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schedule and delivered reliably on that schedule is likely to be judged less harshly
than electricity that is generally available, on average, 4 hours a day but at scattered
or inconvenient intervals, or not according to any predictable schedule, or at varying
voltages. The latter issues are generally considered more quality issues than quantity
issues. Political considerations may also alter how quality is perceived or considered by
local authorities, as Box 5 illustrates.
Box 5. The Politics of Service Quality.
Quality may also become a political issue tied to profitable private-sector alternatives or to political maneuverings around certain aid projects. The issue of quality came to the fore in the provision
of water to the besieged city of Sarajevo in 1993-94. Serb forces controlled the majority of the city’s
water supply and allowed very little into the city. Citizens were forced to get water from a river or to
congregate outside at wells where they were exposed to mortars and sometimes to sniper fire. A Soros
Foundation-funded program built a water purification system that processed water to World Health
Organization (WHO) standards and put the water into the city distribution system. For reasons most
analysts tie to the lucrative trade in water delivery, Sarajevo officials refused to sanction the quality of
the water from the purification system. In fact, almost all residents used the water that arrived through
their taps.

Another example is if water supply to households that has been available several hours
a day is disrupted but then restored after some major interruption to the same number of
hours a day and the service is reliable on a daily basis. In that case, there is not likely to
be a quantity or quality issue giving rise to conflict or tensions that may lead to conflict.
However, citizens may be dissatisfied if the water service, while still averaging the same
number of hours a day as before, is no longer on a reliable schedule. Households can
store water for periods when the service is off and, if the on-hours are reliable, can make
adequate storage provision. But if the hours become concentrated in shorter periods,
such as a previous average of 2 hours a day delivered 2 hours every day becomes 20
hours in 1 day and none for 10 more days, households may not be able to adjust to storage
capacity. For example, in the Philippines, before significant improvements in the 1990s
to the Metropolitan Manila Water System, breakdowns in the reliability and frequency
of water supply led to tensions in poor neighborhoods. This especially occurred in those
neighborhoods relying on multiple trips a day to a neighborhood standpipe to obtain
sufficient water for drinking, cooking, and cleaning.
Water quality issues also relate to inadequate filtering and treatment. As with quantity
issues, the problem is more likely to be either deterioration in the water quality from
some previous time period, a perception that poor water quality varies geographically
or by population segment, or a perception that countries similar in economic and other
circumstances enjoy much better public services. Typically, both quantity and quality
issues for water, sewerage, electricity, education, and public health services combine to
generate tensions, hostility, or outright conflict.
Quality issues in public services often affect citizens more by imposing additional
costs on them to adapt to a deterioration in quality. If electricity is subject to surges and
wide fluctuations in voltage, service recipients may have to spend more to protect electric
appliances from damage or destruction. Households have to invest in greater storage
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capacity to adjust to erratic water supply delivery. Drainage ditches that exist but are
allowed to become overgrown with vegetation or clogged with litter and subsequently
overflow with sewage or with water runoff in the rainy season lead to public health
problems and to flooding.
Quality issues in public transport relate to overcrowding, vehicle or system breakdowns
that disrupt services, and environmental degradation from fuels burned that have longterm health consequences. The last, however, is not likely to be an immediate or near-term
source of tension or conflict in that air pollution from public transport is contributory to,
but not the main cause of, most environmental health problems affecting the urban poor
in developing countries. Environmental health problems are more the consequences of
a cluster of problems such as fuels burned in household cooking, poorly filtered and
treated drinking water, or drainage that has become clogged.
Maintenance and Repair Issues.
This and the next two sections cover the main causes, aside from catastrophic
destruction, of inadequate quantity or poor quality issues. The discussion is separate
because the programming options discussed below are different. In situations of
catastrophic destruction or degradation of services, ending conflict or reducing tensions
that might lead to conflict have to focus on immediately addressing quantity or quality
issues, even if there has been a history of neglected or poor maintenance that has led
to some services being more vulnerable to conflict and natural disaster-related damage.
Training and assistance in routine operation and maintenance, or policy changes to
improve resource allocations between and within sectors, or management and human
capacity improvements are typically important long-term interventions. However,
if actual and perceived problems in quantity or quality, particularly issues of uneven
distribution, have already led to or followed from high levels of tension or conflict, then
directly addressing the quantity and quality issues has to be among the first steps, or at a
minimum, simultaneous steps if sufficient resources are available to address everything
at once.
Many conflict-prone countries neglect maintenance and fail to make routine repairs
of small problems before they become large problems. Underground utilities are the
most vulnerable because problems do not become immediately visible. As leakage in a
water distribution system increases, system pressure is often increased to make up for
the lower volume, and leakage is exacerbated. Older cities in industrialized countries also
suffer from similar problems, as systems are comprised of distribution lines that may be
anywhere from 10 to more than 100 years old. Unaccounted-for water, which consists
both of water lost to leakage and water that reaches consumers but is not metered or
measured, in a very well run utility can be below 10 percent of water that enters the
distribution system. A general standard of less than 20 percent is considered efficient. In
older systems, unaccounted for water can easily exceed 50 percent and gets as high as 75
percent.
Until a leak detection and maintenance system is put in place, it is impossible to
determine how much unaccounted for water is due to physical leakage and how much
to unmeasured usage (illegal taps, for example). In regions where stability operations are
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likely to be conducted, it is highly likely that routine maintenance and preventive repairs
of water systems and other utilities will have been neglected. When U.S. military and
civilian personnel first entered Iraq, they found a sewage pumping station in Baghdad to
be inoperative, with sewage bypassing the station and flowing directly into the river. The
main pumps had frozen over a decade ago and were never repaired.
When infrastructure is relatively new, it needs little maintenance and almost no
repairs. Over time, though, even the best constructed infrastructure will require attention
and investment to maintain it. When infrastructure is located underground, as is the case
with water and sewage systems, small leaks and other minor problems do not become
visible until more advanced degradation has occurred. Operations budgets that contain
detection equipment to spot problems early, stockage of repair parts for quick response,
and stockpiles of operating supplies are easier to cut because they are expenditures
anticipating costs that may not even be incurred during the budget year. And sometimes
the problem is not cutting maintenance out of the budget, but including it in the first place.
Most poor country governments budget insufficient funds for public works maintenance
due to lack of resources, or preference for new capital investment, or lack of realization of
the importance of routine preventive maintenance.
Many of the problems of routine maintenance are obvious in the aftermath of conflict.
Garbage has not been collected, drainage ditches and sewers have become clogged, and
war has damaged some facilities and exacerbated stress in what were probably already
leaky water lines and other underground utilities. Supplies have not been delivered to
health clinics, and schools may have been used by combatants and suffered damage as a
result. Communications within the conflict area and to regions outside the area have been
disrupted. Most importantly, the problems are readily visible to the population.
Service Sector Organization and Policy Issues.
The main organizational and policy issues in basic public services provision cluster
into two groups: (1) setting priorities and allocating resources among priorities, and (2)
assigning responsibility to central versus local providers. Decisions about which public
services to provide, in what quantities, and where are made on the basis of both technical
and political criteria. Often the voices of political and economic elites carry more weight
than those of average citizens or the poor. As a result, public priorities and spending can
favor services that benefit the privileged few, for example, university systems or modern
hospitals. Primary education, primary health care clinics, and improved rural roads may
be neglected. Generally, in stability operations these skewed priorities may not be able to
be addressed immediately during the reconstruction phase. However, in the stabilization
phase, supporting basic institutional development including policy improvements entails
discouraging policies and practices that have led to neglected maintenance and putting
higher priorities on repair and maintenance than on new construction. It is important to
note that it is not only developing country governments, but donors and military forces
that also see new construction as more glamorous and attention-getting than the nuts
and bolts of improved operations on existing systems. In any case, as with neglected
maintenance, citizens’ perceptions of the existing authority is also based on the quantity
and quality of services.
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A second policy and sector organization issue is how the existing authority deals with
services in squatter settlements and other informally organized areas. The policy not
to provide services may be deliberate, as these areas are regarded as illegal settlements
that need to be discouraged. Providing services would only prolong the existence of the
informal settlement. Withholding services makes sense when: (a) economic growth is
occurring at a sufficient rate that there is a discernible “graduation path” as people who
move initially from rural areas to informal squatter settlements are able to find work
and then migrate to serviced, formal sections of the urban area; or (b) the government is
providing more formally organized and serviced settlement areas. But if the “graduation
path” is either objectively slow or is perceived by citizens to be lengthy, the policy may
produce a level of hostility and tension that undermines the regime.
Another organization and policy issue that affects both how services have been
provided (quantity and quality) and what kinds of interventions during stability operations
are most likely to be effective is the assignment of responsibility between national and
local authorities to make decisions about public services provision and to provide basic
services. Systems in which all authority rests in central government—both policymaking
and management of basic services—are more prone to elite capture. That is, the dominant
group or coalition that controls the center also controls access to services everywhere.
Complete central control does not equate automatically to uneven access to services, but
it does make it more possible, and the history of regimes that have given rise to conflict
or regimes that have begun to fail is dominated by those that are highly centralized.
Generally, the more centrally planned and managed the system, the greater the
likelihood of a mismatch between the demand for services and the supply. Central
systems tend to overbuild facilities in some cases with a “one size fits all” mentality.
Centralized systems also tend to have a capital city bias in which services to outlying
areas are sacrificed to ensure the capital city is well-serviced. Centralized systems tend
to be less responsive to local demands, and even central government personnel based in
regions or local areas may find central ministry managers unresponsive.
Management and Human Capacity Issues.
Potentially contributing to each of the previous four issue clusters are management
and human capacity weaknesses. Often in developing countries, there simply are not
enough skilled and well-trained personnel to run a modern state. To a considerable
degree, human resource and management systems investments typically follow the
pattern of other resource allocations. Medical professionals, university faculty, lawyers,
planning, engineering, and construction services personnel are in demand because of
the pattern of investments in universities, hospitals, and capital infrastructure facilities.
Trained teachers at the primary and secondary school level, public health professionals,
and skilled repair tradesmen are in relatively shorter supply.
Management attention to the day-to-day diagnosis of public services facilities
operating problems, performance measurement that might identify declining quantity or
quality, and routine maintenance is limited, and personnel trained to perform those tasks
are in scarce supply. In a few settings where resources have been more substantial, access
to international best practices may be reasonably good in the categories listed above in
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which resources have been concentrated, but personnel in day-to-day management of
public services are less likely to have up-to-date skills and knowledge. Iraq, for example,
had a highly educated population during the previous regime. Former colonies may also
have considerable indigenous expertise at the time of independence, albeit among the
former colonial population. South Africa is a case where that knowledge and expertise has
been well-exploited. Zimbabwe has over time driven out much of that expertise without
having invested in the population to develop skills and knowledge. Where a regime has
been overthrown through violent and prolonged conflict, it is highly likely that many of
the educated elite have fled the country and may not perceive the situation conducive to
returning to the country for years after the conflict has ended.
Medium- and longer-term actions to improve management systems and human
capacity are critical development interventions.8 In stability operations, management and
skills development need to focus more on development of skills and understanding that
address immediate quantity and quality of service issues, as these deficits are more likely
to lead to tension and inhibit conflict resolution. Development of rehabilitation and repair
and policy skills and management practices that focus on operation and maintenance
generally have more short-term payoff in improving delivery of services than do longerterm development programs focusing on broader management and policy analysis skills.
Of course, there is no clear line that indicates when it is timely to shift to longer-term
institutional development and management capacity building. But generally, assuming
there has been an end to conflict and no ongoing insurgency, stability operations likely
will have given way to longer-term development programs.
Trade-offs.
There are two sets of trade-offs among intervention options discussed in this
section: Short-term versus long-term and large-scale construction versus repair and
rehabilitation.
Short-term versus long-term. Implicit in the discussion above is the need to focus shortterm, immediate attention on those public services deficits that give rise to perceptions of
uneven access to quantity and quality of services. In an immediate post-conflict period,
the population is more sensitive to uneven distribution of hardship than to the initial
hardship itself, assuming there is no significant humanitarian crisis with groups lacking
food, water, and/or shelter. If electricity services are disrupted and substantially less
available than before but there is no visible unfairness in who has service, there is at
least a short period of time in which authority, whether the existing government or an
international authority, has the opportunity to restore such services, as illustrated in Box
6 in the case of Aceh Province, Indonesia, after the disastrous 2004 tsunami.
In addressing short-term issues, donors and military forces both have the tendency
in post-conflict settings to bring in international NGOs, uniformed personnel, and other
organizations to fill immediate capacity gaps. To restore services to some reasonable level,
this may be the only option. This tendency certainly supports more immediate restoration
of services, but it contributes little or nothing to the longer-term and essential goal of host
country state institutions being perceived as efficient, effective, and accountable to the
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Box 6. Equal Distribution of Hardship in an Emergency Can Reduce Conflict Potential.
The Indonesian province of Aceh after the tsunami is a case in point. The need to meet immediate and widespread shortages of food, water and shelter overshadowed any other options. Only after
the short-term emergency conditions were addressed did citizens’ attention to distributional issues
surface. The efforts of the Indonesian government and external donor reconstruction programs ameliorated much of the potential for conflict renewal by addressing previous inequity issues and demonstrating clearly the intent to treat Aceh province in a more transparent manner and to integrate it into
longer-term development programs.

population for meeting basic needs. The risk is that a parallel system will develop in
which the population, and even host country authorities, come to rely upon the outside
organizations for doing things. S&R actors need to not neglect their more fundamental
role of supporting the development of host country institutions to deliver services.
From a long-term development point of view, addressing many of the policy and
management issues, sector management, and human capacity problems is more important,
but usually has to give way in the short-term to addressing service delivery deficits and
the policies and practices that are contributory causes to those deficits. An exception is
when the regime has exercised its central control in a systematic fashion to favor some
groups at the expense of others. Paying attention only to the physical aspects of service
deficits, especially if the reconstruction, stabilization, or development activities replicate
the geographic or other characteristics of uneven distribution of services may in fact
exacerbate underlying tensions and provoke conflict or a resumption of conflict. In one
form or another, addressing policies or management practices that have led in the first
place to unevenness in public services provision is a short-term necessity. As discussed
under programming options, one way to address this is to promote some decentralization
of authority and resource allocation to local authority so citizens can see that their needs
are being addressed.
Large-scale physical construction versus repair, rehabilitation, tools, and supplies. The
temptation is considerable in the event of major service delivery deficits, if resources
permit to bring in large-scale physical construction projects. The trade-offs in such a
decision are the likelihood of less involvement of skilled local personnel and the potential
for incompatibility between new systems and existing systems. Training requirements
for personnel to maintain the new systems, spare parts, potential lack of interoperability
between existing and new systems, and the potential lack of fuel from local sources to
operate the systems are all potential problems. On the other hand, providing diagnostic
equipment, tools, spare parts, and material and supplies to allow existing host country
personnel to make repairs, rehabilitate systems, and put systems back into operation
may produce a nearer-term positive impact on both quantity and quality. The trade-off,
however, is that preexisting service deficits caused by a shortage of major facilities such
as power generation, water impoundment, water treatment, and sewage treatment plants
are not addressed.

16

Options.
Pay attention to service deficits that are likely to provoke tensions. As should be apparent
from the discussion of issues and trade-offs above, in the reconstruction and stabilization
period, the focus is not strictly on deficits in quantity or quality of services and their causes.
Rather, the initial focus should be on deficits that historically have generated tensions or
conflict or may do so in the immediate term. Those are most likely to be perceptions that
some geographic areas or some population subgroups have been systematically deprived
in the past, or that reconstruction efforts favor some areas or groups to the disadvantage
of others. Aside from emergency humanitarian assistance, reconstruction efforts should
focus on addressing quantity and quality issues that, if not addressed rapidly, will likely
generate hostility toward the government. Caution is necessary to avoid provoking
hostility from previously favored groups by addressing services issues only or mainly in
areas previously disadvantaged. It can be a delicate balance to seek to redress previous
inequities.
Involve host country officials and indigenous skilled personnel in planning decisions and
implementation. Though the temptation is great to bring in international expertise to design
best-case solutions, set priorities, and implement or oversee implementation because it
will be faster and more efficient, it is more likely than not that local personnel will be less
able, or even unwilling, to take over operation of externally designed and constructed
facilities. Further, external parties may perceive the priorities more from a technical, even
engineering, point of view whereas local parties are more likely to understand subtle
differences that could give rise to future hostility.
Maximize low resource inputs of diagnostic equipment, repair tools, parts and supplies over
large-scale equipment. More immediate restoration to preconflict or predisaster conditions,
assuming limited outright or complete destruction of public services facilities, will be
achieved by assisting local personnel with better diagnostic tools, repair parts, and
supplies so that they can make immediate repairs to existing facilities.
Respond to humanitarian needs for immediate service delivery, but look for early possibilities
to build the capacity of sectoral ministries and departments and local governments in planning,
budgeting, and management. When the state is a weak or nonexistent partner, no one
disagrees that S&R actors should respond to the immediate needs of affected populations,
whether directly or through international NGOs and private firms. However, as early as
possible in reconstruction activities, host country government actors should be included
in setting priorities and allocating resources to services improvements. S&R actions
such as quickly establishing interim advisory councils, at the neighborhood level first
and working toward some kind of interim municipal or town council, help stability
operations personnel to get local input early when there are no existing legitimate public
authorities. Particularly at the local government level where actions are readily visible to
the population, some local authority has to be supported, or created if nonexistent, to take
responsibility for improved services. Even if it is primarily the external actors involved
in stability operations providing the resources and much of the expertise, it is necessary
to give as much credit as possible to local authority for improvements. The aim is not to
legitimize the external involvement, but to arrive at a situation where citizens accord legitimacy
to the host country authority (be it central government or local governments) for meeting their
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needs. Winning friends and support for personnel is critical in counterinsurgency situations for
the protection of military and civilian personnel, but ultimately there should be a shift to citizens’
perceiving that it is their government that is improving conditions.
LONG-TERM PLANNING, INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT, BUDGETING,
AND FINANCING
The previous section focused on restoring or improving basic services that affect
citizens on a day-to-day basis. That discussion excluded long-term planning and major
infrastructure investments. This section focuses on the issues involved in long-term
development planning for investment, which includes both broad economic and social
development goals as well as more detailed annual planning for and financing of major
public sector infrastructure. The issues discussed here start at the broadest level of national
economic and social development planning and then narrow down to capital investment
planning at the municipal or other subnational levels:
• National development planning; and,
• Capital investment (infrastructure) planning, budgeting and financing.
The interventions and actions taken by stability operations personnel are influenced
by, but generally do not affect directly, the issues of national development planning and
economic management. For the most part, these broader issues are within the purview
of the Embassy, guided by overall U.S. policy in the country. Military leadership or
other personnel may be engaged in country strategy discussions as part of or with the
U.S. country team or a multinational team, but, with a few exceptions, on-the-ground
stability operations interventions occur within the context of a country’s multiyear
national development framework and strategy for overall management of the economy.
However, stability operations personnel support the involvement of lower levels of
government in regional development planning and encourage the incorporation of
civil society groups and citizens on priorities and strategies expressed in the multiyear
national development plan. The following discussion of national development planning
offers some programming options for stability operations, but mainly provides a context
within which stabilization operations take place.
Key Issues.
National Development Planning. Long-term development planning encompasses both
macro-level national social and economic development planning and a narrower focus
on public sector infrastructure planning and investment. In developing countries, overall
national development strategies—both economic and social—are likely to be expressed
in a multiyear (5 years is typical) national development plan under the responsibility
of a central level planning ministry. This is somewhat unfamiliar territory to many U.S.
Government personnel because the United States itself has no Department of Planning
and no multiyear national development plan. Many other industrial countries and most
less-developed economies rely somewhat to significantly more than the United States on
national planning.
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In the United States, the national government role in broad economic policy is defined
by the Employment Act of 1946, as later amended by the Full Employment and Balanced
Growth Act of 1978. These acts limit the federal role in economic policy to promoting:
• full employment,
• price stability, and
• balanced (not too fast, not too slow) economic growth.
The primary tools employed by the U.S. Government to achieve these three goals consist
of: (a) managing the money supply including credit—monetary policy—and (b) managing
the federal budget either to use expenditures to stimulate growth (deficit spending) or,
more rarely, to cool down the economy by running a budget surplus—fiscal policy. But
specific long-range development planning is not a U.S. federal function. All countries, of
course, use monetary and fiscal policy tools, but with the addition for many of a centrally
focused national development plan. One of the key reasons for limited U.S. national
government involvement in economic development planning and support is the federal
structure of the U.S. system, though as noted in Box 7, some states have federal multiyear
national development planning as well.
Box 7. National Planning Is Not Absent in Federal States.
Even the largest federal state in the world—India—focuses the resources of the central government on broad economic and social development through a comprehensive, multi-year national development plan. The plan directs central government spending, regulation of the economy, and many of
the decisions that state governments are empowered to undertake.

By contrast to the United States, in most failed and failing states the central
government has a more extensive instrumental role in promoting economic growth and
social development, using the public sector to allocate significant economic and financial
resources, controlling access to and use of natural resources, making public sector
investments to meet service delivery needs, and stimulating private sector economic
investment. Owning and/or managing much of the country’s natural resources is
a governmental—often exclusively central—responsibility. Personnel involved in
S&R interventions to restore basic services may find that central officials defer to the
national development plan for overall sectoral and regional priorities, and may or may
not make public sector investments in the same sectors or regions that S&R personnel
may feel are necessary to achieve reconstruction or stabilization objectives. The latter
stages of stability operations—laying the groundwork for sustainable political, social,
and economic development—will take into account the role of central planning and the
overall national development framework. Responsibility is at the level of the U.S. country
team, but interventions on the ground to assist in infrastructure planning, to strengthen
the role of regional and local government institutions in local economic development,
and to restart larger enterprises, often failed state-owned enterprises, take place in the
context of the country’s own overall national strategy.
Characteristic of national development plans for many undeveloped conflict countries
is the alleviation of widespread poverty as a primary purpose motivating government’s
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large role in the economy and society. The international community’s expression of
broad social and economic goals for the least developed countries is the Millennium
Development Goals (see Box 8).
Box 8. Millennium Development Goals.
The eight Millennium Development Goals have been adopted by the international community as
a framework for the development activities of over 190 countries in ten regions; they have been articulated into over 20 targets and over 60 indicators.
1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger
2. Achieve universal primary education
3. Promote gender equality and empower women
4. Reduce child mortality
5. Improve maternal health
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria and other diseases
7. Ensure environmental sustainability
8. Develop a global partnership for development.

The most common manifestation of these goals is in a Five-Year National Development
Plan. The main implication for stability operations of understanding a country’s National
Development Plan is the realization that not only does the central government play a
major role in steering the allocation of public sector resources toward various economic
development possibilities, but also that it controls a large share of the national wealth.
Examples include oil resources in Indonesia, Iraq, and Nigeria; forests in Brazil and
Thailand; precious metals and ores in Ghana and the DRC. Stability operations, even
during reconstruction, when involved with restoring or rebuilding major facilities such
as an oil refinery, are likely to be focusing on facilities that are in place as a result of a
central government long-term development plan and may or may not be in the plan
for the type of restoration or investment that external, stability operations personnel
think is appropriate. Recognition that specific interventions may support or undermine
the national development plan is an important consideration in undertaking stability
operations.
Further, most failing and failed states have a tradition of central planning in which
there is little or no participation of regional or local actors, and limited or no involvement
of the private sector or civil society. In stability operations, national economic and social
development policy issues fall within the purview of the U.S. embassy, and in some cases
with significant multinational engagement with the World Bank, the UN, the European
Union, and other major industrial countries. On the ground, stability operations will
engage in issues in which reconstruction activities affect, or are affected by, national
development planning and, particularly in the stabilization phase of stability operations,
in encouraging greater involvement of the private sector, civil society, and subnational
levels of government. Box 9 describes the Afghanistan National Development Strategy.
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Box 9. National Development Planning in Afghanistan.
The Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) outlines the Afghan government’s plans
for security, governance, economic growth, and poverty reduction during the period 2008-13. It is the
product of extensive consultations with over 17,000 people from the national, subnational, international, private sector, civil society, religious, and traditional communities. The international community
provided significant assistance in the development and preparation of the ANDS, specifically through
the External Advisory Group, which focused on implementing the principles of the Paris Declaration.
The strategy supports and expands the commitments to reach benchmarks proposed in the Afghanistan Compact and the Afghanistan Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), and it lays out these
objectives under three pillars:
1. Security: Achieve Nationwide Stabilization, strengthen law enforcement, and improve personal
security for every Afghan.
2. Good Governance, Rule of Law, and Human Rights: Strengthen democratic practice and institutions, human rights, the rule of law, delivery of public services, and government accountability.
3. Economic and Social Development: Reduce poverty, ensure sustainable development through
a private sector-led market economy, improve human development indicators, and make significant
progress toward achieving the MDGs.
The ANDS also addresses cross-cutting issues such as counternarcotics, anti-corruption, capacity
development, gender equity, and the environment.
The Afghan government has requested $50.1 billion in financing to achieve the goals set forth in
the ANDS. It has also developed a framework for implementation, monitoring, and evaluation to ensure increased aid effectiveness so that these benchmarks may be successfully met.

Capital investment planning, budgeting, and financing. Of greater import for stability
operations than national development planning are the issues and options involved
in specific public sector infrastructure investment planning and budgeting and capital
financing for infrastructure. National development plans shape the policy and strategy,
but specific investment plans and strategies are for the most part the responsibility of
sectoral ministries such as transportation, energy, public works, health, and education. In
addition, the role of subnational levels of government and civil society in setting priorities
for investments in public sector infrastructure is likely to be important in stability
operations, particularly in activities that lay the groundwork for long-term, sustainable
development.
There are two issues with capital investment planning being the sole responsibility of
sectoral ministries:
1. The incentives for a central sectoral ministry are to aggrandize their capital
investment budget, potentially resulting in overbuilding some infrastructure to the
neglect of maintaining existing infrastructure (as noted in the previous section); and,
2. Central sectoral ministries tend to plan capital facilities to preset standards that are
applied universally across the country, in many cases not adapted to local conditions,
and even if so adapted, not in affordable quantities that take into account the availability
of long-term financial support for infrastructure-based services.
The authority to award large-scale construction contracts is a significant temptation to
underpaid civil servants. Countries that rank high on international indices of corruption
are in that category in part because public sector resources flow to central ministries—such
as Ministries of Public Works—that engage in large-scale infrastructure construction. The
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incentives for senior officials to promote large scale capital projects are to secure greater
power through a larger budget, and in some cases to increase the opportunity for personal
gain through control over contract awards for large-scale capital projects.
Even where corruption is not a significant factor, central ministry planners are
distant from, and often poorly connected to, priorities as seen at the local level. Among
central ministries, the competition is over share of the national budget. Prioritization at
the national level is a competition against national estimates of need for water sector
investments, or education sector investments, or health sector investments. But the
prioritization outcomes reflected in the national budget for annual capital investments is
less likely to reflect average citizens’ priorities.
Another issue with central management of capital investment strategies is with the
most common financing mechanisms. In virtually all lower-income countries, public
infrastructure investments that are planned centrally also are financed in the central
budget through annual budget allocations to the sectoral ministries. Given the incentives
in sectoral ministries for maximizing their budgets, infrastructure investments may not
be prioritized in terms of economic objectives—investing in infrastructure that promotes
economic development—or social objectives—investing in infrastructure that reduces
inequities in access to services. As a result, the infrastructure investments may not
generate the economic growth to pay for their long-term maintenance and to provide for
periodic rehabilitation so that premature full replacement of infrastructure is avoided.
That places an unaffordable burden on future generations to finance replacement well
before it should be necessary, and ultimately either increases the need for future higher
taxes and higher charges to the users of the services, or retards sustainable economic
growth.
While stability operations/interventions have limited roles to play in addressing this
issue, there are S&R interventions discussed in the Options section below that promote
more economically and socially sustainable decisions on capital investment finance.
In the latter stages of stability operations as they transition to long-term development
programs, the sources of finance for public infrastructure are arenas for engagement.
In the early stages, stability operations use U.S. funds from the Departments of Defense
and State, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), or other agencies for
support to improve public sector facilities and infrastructure, and other partners in a
multinational coalition. These are short-term remedies for immediate needs, but, of
course, do not address most infrastructure issues that arise in preconflict, conflict, and
post-conflict conditions. Stability operations can and should contribute to improving on
the country’s management of infrastructure financing operations, but mainly through
supporting long-term planning, budgeting, and financing strategies that lead to, or at
least do not contradict, longer-term policy and management reforms that likely will take
place subsequent to stability operations.
Trade-offs.
The key trade-offs involved in long-term planning and capital investments are twofold.
The first is between a planning and budgeting process that is top-down versus one that
is bottom-up, and includes the participation of the private sector and civil society. The
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second trade-off concerns public infrastructure investment finance and is between central
versus local government financing. Clearly in many post-conflict situations, government
at all levels will lack the resources to make investment and will depend upon S&R actors
for financing. What is important, though, is how the provision of external financing lays
the groundwork for a sustainable system of public investment finance.
Public finance systems also involve top-down versus bottom-up issues, as well as
civil society and private sector engagement issues. The discussion here is separate to
facilitate understanding of sequencing and of actions that may be taken in rebuilding
government to improve both planning for development and investments and the longerterm development of robust means for financing investments.
Development planning and budgeting: top-down versus bottom-up. One of the key tradeoffs
involved both in long-term national development plans and more specific capital
investment plans is top-down versus bottom-up planning. As discussed above, countries
have a long-term development framework that expresses broad national strategy for
economic and social development. The plan, to varying degrees of specificity, commits
central government policy to an overall pattern of investments in physical infrastructure
and economic and social development programs. Specific capital investment projects
typically are not part of the national development plan, but rather are contained within
sectoral ministry annual (and sometimes multi-year) plans and in rare cases subnational
government investment plans. In some countries with a strong central planning history
that emulate Soviet-style or other state planning models, the national plan may determine
how central government will allocate resources during the planning period—5- and 10year development plans are the most common time periods. In countries without a history
of detailed central planning, development plans may focus around broad social and
economic objectives, but may not determine the plans and budgets of central government
ministries in the same way, and may or may not include involvement of subnational
levels of government.
National development plans are not only potentially important for revealing
expressed or implied priorities for central government resource allocations, but they
should be instrumental in shaping external donor assistance flows to the country. Where
interventions are major and country-wide, an agreement between the host country
and the international community may be expressed in an international compact. Both
Iraq and Afghanistan have international compact agreements in which the respective
governments commit to long-term development goals with quantitative and qualitative
measurable indicators of progress, a timetable for achievement of progress, and specific
commitments of the country’s resources to objectives. In return, the international
community pledges financial and other resources to support the compact. Box 10 briefly
notes some of the key features of the international Compact with Iraq. S&R actors need to
understand what previous decisions have been made on overall development priorities
and government budget commitments, the extent to which the multiyear development
plan is really guiding or even determining what central ministries will be budgeting for
and executing, and the extent to which there is widespread societal consensus on the
priorities as expressed in the development plan.
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Box 10. Excerpts from the Compact with Iraq.
The Compact will be implemented and monitored and actions to achieve its goals adjusted where
necessary through a Consultative Group Process. This process will both build on and feed into the
National Development Strategy [NDS] which will be improved through annual review and update.
[including] . . . transforming needs and targets into actionable reform and development programmes .
. . [with] coordination among national, regional, governorate, and sectoral levels. Broad participation
in the review and annual update of the NDS and development programs . . . [with] inclusiveness from
early stages onward involving civil society private sector and international partners in addition to the
various levels of Government. . . . The resulting reform and investment plans and costing will feed into
the budgetary processes at the various levels within an integrated federal fiscal framework. The integrity of both NDS and the budget will be ensured by only executing projects which have been included
in the NDS and the budget.

The international Compact with Iraq, for example, expresses an explicit commitment
on the part of the central government to employ a consultative process to reflect priorities
at national, regional, governorate, and sectoral levels (see Box 10). In 2007-08, each of
Iraq’s 18 governorates developed provincial strategies that, for most of the provinces,
included input from district and subdistrict leaders as well as representatives of business,
professional, religious, and civil society organizations. In March 2008, these individual
Provincial Development Strategies were formally presented to the Ministry of Planning
and the Prime Minister, and the planning minister committed to reflect these regional
and local strategies in the National Development Strategy (NDS).
The initial Compact with Afghanistan, formally presented at the 2006 international
conference in Bonn, Germany, expressed the agreement of the international community
and the Afghanistan government to a broad NDS, with all references to Afghanistan as a
whole, or to central government, with no references to institutions of government below
the central level other than a reference to provincial elections. By 2008, the Compact
with Afghanistan was modified to affirm the importance of strengthening the role of
government below the central level, and to reflect more priorities expressed below the
central government level (see Box 11).
The temptation is strong in post-conflict situations to focus on a strong central
government capable of a coherent and apparently unified approach to addressing a
country’s economic and social development problems. The trade-off, however, is that
the factions and forces that have been involved in the crisis that prompted international
assistance or intervention are often unable to reconcile fully differences within the
context of a single, centralized process. International experience in the last decade is
still evolving but developing planning processes are more effective when they include
extensive and meaningful participation of institutions below the central government, and
at that subnational level (regional, municipal, village) of citizens and formal/informal
leaders that reflect social, ethnic, sometimes religious, and other differences. There is not
a single, best solution. In Iraq, while some provinces are relatively homogenous with
respect to major social and religious differences, other provinces are quite heterogeneous.
In other cases, relatively strong geographic differentiation of deep population divides—
some natural and some achieved by internal migration—determines the form. Box 12 on
Kosovo provides an example.
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Box 11. Excerpts from the Compact with Afghanistan (Revised 2008).
The Paris Declaration noted, in part: “The Afghan Government has committed itself to pursuing
political and economic reform. The international community has agreed to provide increased resources
and to use them in a more effective way. . . . This strategy, which was presented to us [the international
community] today, will be our roadmap for joint action over the next five years and sets our shared
priorities. We will align our efforts behind the financing and implementation of the Afghan National
Development Strategy in order to achieve the objectives agreed in the Afghanistan Compact. We have
agreed that to be successful the ANDS must have a substantial impact in every district and village
throughout Afghanistan. . . . To strengthen Afghan government institutions and improve delivery of
services to all Afghans: In order to ensure that the progress achieved during the past six years is sustained, the Afghan Government agreed to take action to increase trust in government by improving
public administration, local governance, justice, police and other law enforcement institutions. In this
context, it committed itself to ensure that appointments are made on the basis of merit. In support of
these efforts, the international community agreed to increase support for strengthening state institutions at the national and sub-national level, including through larger scale civil service capacity-building. . . . The international community also committed itself to providing aid in a way that promotes
local procurement and capacity-building. We agreed that the benefits of development must reach all
provinces equitably.”

Box 12. Geographic and Political Decentralization in Kosovo.
In Kosovo, Muslim and non-Muslim populations have almost completely segregated into separate geographic areas. Planning for economic and social development, resource allocation for services
delivery improvements, and the organization of public sector authority reflects this geographic separation. Increasing the authority, importance, and responsibility of municipal governments in planning
and executing capital investments as well as improvement in routine services is a key element in the
post-conflict strategy for addressing differences by more reliance on local authority.

External financing versus host country finance. It is difficult and artificial to separate
development planning from the means for financing development investments. Typically
in the least economically developed countries, capital investments in water systems,
streets and roads, public schools, and health clinics and hospitals are paid for from the
central government budget on an annual basis. By contrast, in most highly developed
economies, the infrastructure base for many public services is financed by lower levels of
government. For example, in the United States, despite some federal public investment
programs in such sectors as transportation and decades ago water and sewer systems, over
75 percent of total U.S. public sector capital investment is by state and local governments.
Even of the 25 percent of investment that is federal, 10 percent is direct spending on
projects and 15 percent consists of grants to state and local governments.11 Hence, in
the United States, the federal government does not lead the way, either in the sense of a
national development plan or in the sense of the federal government having a primary
role in public infrastructure investment.
As already discussed in the introductory section, Western industrialized economies
typically are more decentralized, both politically and in service provision, than less
advanced economies. In countries in which stability operations are most likely, the
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U.S. Government can expect that most capital investments will be financed by central
government. However, that is not universal, and military personnel should be cautious in
not undertaking capital projects, even on a small scale, that are typically the responsibility
of regional or local governments. Projects undertaken by and financed by lower-level
governments are more likely to involve citizen input into sector/project selection and
are more likely to be designed to be affordable in terms of long-term operation and
maintenance costs. In addition, lower-level governments are more likely to recover at
least the operating costs, if not the capital costs, from charges to service users, which has
the effect of tempering demand for unaffordable levels of services.12
The temptation during reconstruction is strong to build a facility and/or provide a
service at no cost to the beneficiaries, believing that the beneficiaries have been exploited
in the past and should not have further costs imposed on them through user charges.
However, such fees have been or are being introduced in the host country to provide
the maximum level of services possible within economic resources available to the
society. Research has regularly documented that the poor in developing countries are
willing to pay some level for services, and are much more likely to place higher value on
those services, be less likely to abuse them, and more likely to support their long-term
maintenance.13
A “free” service provided by external donors, aside from emergency relief, can
undermine the potential for successful local financing mechanisms to generate funds
at least for operation and maintenance. Financing mechanisms should cover a share
of capital costs from affordable user charges, charges that the population already has
demonstrated willingness to pay. Further, military personnel should ensure that the use
of external financial resources, such as Commander’s Emergency Response Program
(CERP) funds, for a facility do not substitute for and replace funds available locally. For
example, as countries assign some degree of responsibility for financing services to the
local level, central governments typically also transfer some financial resources collected
by central government, such as exploitation of a natural resource or taxation, to local
levels. Personnel must ensure that facilities or projects they fund are additive to, not
substitutes for, what local authorities would otherwise have done with central transfers.
Options.
In general, stability operations actors have limited opportunities to affect long-term
economic and social development planning and long-term capital investment planning
and finance. However, actions by S&R personnel are affected by host country policies
and actions in these issues, and S&R interventions sometimes can undermine positive
directions toward which host countries may be heading.
Encourage and support bottom-up input into national development plans and strategies. As
the Iraq and Afghanistan examples of national development strategies indicate, there
are varying degrees of commitments on the part of host country governments to take
the “longer and messier” route of involving citizens and lower level governments in
determining multiyear, national priorities. The initial strategy of the Afghan government
and its international partners was to create a strong technocratic central government and
to extend its reach into the provinces. Weak support of central government in many of the
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provinces and the inability of central government to contribute to improved basic living
conditions in many of the provinces were contributing factors to a shift in the international
community as well as the Afghan government toward paying more attention to local
development planning, as reflected in significant shifts in emphasis in the Compact With
Afghanistan from 2006 to 2008.
In Iraq, the national development strategy has incorporated provincial development
strategies developed in each of the 18 provinces. This has led to an integration of provincial
strategies into a comprehensive national strategy for exploitation of natural resources—oil,
arable land, and water—to develop a competitive economy. The comprehensive strategy
is still a work in progress, with significant decisions yet to be made on the allocation
of proceeds from exploiting the country’s oil resources to overall national priorities,
and to locally determined priorities at regional and provincial levels. The outcomes of
both the Afghan and Iraq cases are still too early to judge. At least in some of Iraq’s
provinces, a participatory process for including civil society and a variety of interests has
served to mitigate conflict and to achieve resource allocation aligned to some degree with
local priorities (see Box 13 for an Iraq example). Participatory development planning in
Indonesia, even before significant decentralization decisions were made at the central
level, resulted in central ministries redirecting at least some resources from Jakarta-based
decisions to decisions made at the regional level.
Box 13. Participatory Provincial Planning.
The Chairman of the Tameem (Kirkuk) Provincial Development Strategy (PDS) Committee remarked at the conclusion of the 6-month long planning process: “two events in the past year have
done more than anything else to unite Iraqis—the Asian Cup football victory and the provincial development strategy process.” Following the completion of the Anbar Province PDS, the Governor and
Provincial Council decided to further devolve capital investment funds allocated from the Ministry of
Finance to the province to the district and subdistrict levels. Of the funds from MOF to the province, 70
percent are now further allocated for lower level decisions on local priorities.

Use U.S. Government funding to buy into locally determined priorities rather than priorities
that stability operations personnel identify. The temptation is great to bring in international
expertise to design best-case solutions, set priorities, and implement or oversee
implementation because it will be faster and more efficient. However, the risk is that local
personnel will be unable, or even unwilling, to take over operation of externally designed
and constructed facilities. Further, external parties may perceive the priorities more from
a technical or engineering point of view. Local actors are more likely to understand subtle
allocation or quality/quantity differences that could give rise to future hostility.
Early U.S. interventions are likely to occur without much knowledge of locally
determined priorities. Stability operations resources should certainly be used to address
emergency issues and to demonstrate responsiveness, but resources for small-scale capital
projects for the most part should be reserved until local participatory consultation and
planning processes can be established. This need not incur any delays, as neighborhood
meetings to identify priorities can take only a matter of days, building up to more
organized and systematic processes for issues that cut across neighborhoods. In the case
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of larger-scale investments such as rehabilitation of a pumping station requiring larger
resources, if a local government is already in place, or being formed, it is better to reserve
the external funds to support an investment that can be credited to the participatory
planning process and the local government. A key purpose of S&R operations is to
support the development of legitimate political institutions that engage with civil society
and are responsive to citizens, as discussed later. S&R support for capital projects is best
used when it also supports this purpose.
Avoid becoming an alternative to host country government mechanisms for determining
local priorities. Just as with restoring basic routine services, stability resources should not
substitute for national and local resources when they are available or can be mobilized
for large-scale infrastructure construction. Iraq and Afghanistan are good contrasts.
The national resources are not available at the current stage of economic development
for large-scale infrastructure construction in Afghanistan. By contrast, in Iraq, once
production and distribution of oil resources were restored, significant capital investment
funds became available for infrastructure. The primary impediments to using those
resources were political and managerial, rather than resource availability. To the extent
that U.S. and other reconstruction funds for major projects were available to substitute
for use of existing Iraqi resources, there were fewer incentives to solve those political and
managerial issues.
But there is no single correct response. With high levels of violence, even in a resource
richer country, applying those resources to address basic infrastructure deficiencies is
difficult. Military personnel have to balance use of resources to restore infrastructure as a
way to reduce high levels of violence versus accepting the lag time for applying resources
available within the country to addressing those deficits.
Economically and financially, U.S. Government interventions should also support
the development of some local financial participation in public service facilities by the
beneficiaries of services, particularly user charges, even if they are only modest ones. In
some societies in which citizens have never been called upon to pay for public services—
Iraq in the previous regime was an extreme example of this—introducing such reform is
likely to take place after stability operations have ended.
During stability operations, however, no actions should be taken that undermine
existing user charges, even if they are only token payments for some services. Even a
resource wealthy society cannot address all needs simultaneously, and sustainable longterm economic development requires the financial participation of individual citizens
and the private sector in paying for public services.
Support technical management improvements in capital investment planning to reduce oneoff project financing in favor of multi-year capital improvements. Even systems with a tradition
of long-term national development planning do not necessarily have robust systems for
multi-year, integrated capital investment planning. As discussed earlier, capital projects
are typically generated from budget bargaining between sectoral ministries and the
finance and planning ministries. Decisions on capital projects typically are divorced from
consideration of the long-term current budget requirements for adequate operation and
maintenance costs. Furthermore, such investments are generally financed through the
current budget (central government) and rarely anticipate the future cost of periodic
rehabilitation required to keep a capital facility in operation for its maximum life span. Box
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14 elaborates a standard best practice multiyear capital investment planning and budgeting process, which is an important component of technical management improvements.14
This process can be introduced in the latter phase of stabilization operations or early in
the period after formal stability operations have ceased.
Box 14. Capital Facilities Planning and Budgeting.
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.
7.
8.

Identify present service characteristics (inventory facilities and service levels)
a. Coverage (quantity)
b. Quality
c. Cost per unit of service (efficiency)
Identify environmental trends
a. Population growth projections
b. Changing regulatory environment
c. Employment and economic development trends
Develop service objectives
a. Extension of service to new population or area (coverage)
b. Improvement in quality of service
c. Opportunities to stimulate economic growth
Develop preliminary list of capital projects and cost estimates
a. Rehabilitation of existing facilities
b. Replacement of existing facilities
c. Addition of new facilities
Identify financial resources
a. External assistance
b. Projected growth in present revenue base
c. Potential for direct cost recovery for individual projects
d. Use of credit
Select subset of projects for inclusion in 5-year capital investment plan (CIP)
Identify future recurrent cost impact of CIP on operating budget
Include first year of CIP in annual budget estimate.

ECONOMIC GOODS AND SERVICES
This section discusses a relatively narrow range of issues and potential actions in
rebuilding government, focusing on government’s provision of economic goods and
services. The two previous subsections focused on basic, routine service delivery to
citizens, and long-term planning and investment for public services provision. The third
responsibility of government within the overall category of effective provision of goods
and services is government’s role in supporting an environment that is conducive to
economic growth and in the performance of specific governmental functions focused on
economic growth.
Much broader treatments of strategies and actions focusing on economic growth in
stability operations, or conflict and post-conflict environments, are readily available.15 The
topical coverage of two of these references is illustrated in Box 15. These and other guides
to post-conflict economic growth share a common point of view—that economic growth
is primarily a private sector led phenomenon, and the various roles of government are
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primarily associated with effective and efficient performance of governmental functions,
not the government’s direct participation in the economy as an economic actor. Those
and other references are more appropriate for strategies to rebuild the economy. Since
this guide focuses on rebuilding public services, primarily government’s roles, only
those issues and possible interventions are discussed that specifically relate to rebuilding
government.
Box 15. Rebuilding the Economy to Restore Economic Growth.
United Nations Development Program USAID Guide to Economic Growth in
(UNDP) Post-Conflict Economic Recov- Post-Conflict Countries
ery
Infrastructure rehabilitation

Macroeconomic foundations
• Fiscal policy and institutions
• Monetary policy and institutions

Human capital investment

Employment generation

Re-integration of ex-combatants and
special groups

Private sector development
• Enabling environment
• Enterprise development

Job generation and other economic opportunities

Agriculture

Strengthening local (government and
civil society) institutions

Banking and finance

Access to financial resources

Trade policy

Macroeconomic policies

Infrastructure

Key Issues.
There are two key issues in rebuilding government to support economic growth: (1)
Rebuilding government to support the enabling environment for economic growth, and
(2) Rebuilding government for direct interventions in the economy.
In countries where conflict has been isolated within a region, the state institutions that
play major roles in the economy are already in place, with the possible exception of the
conflict region itself. Even though there may be significant weaknesses in these existing
national government institutions and their economic growth policies, S&R interventions
in this situation are likely to deal only or primarily with the affected region. Similarly,
the state institutions that directly intervene in the economy, such as the central bank, also
are typically in place. Stability operations are not likely to be involved with reforming
or improving these existing national institutions that have primary impact on the
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economy in those situations where the government, or at least the national government,
is substantially in place.
Where violent conflict has damaged or destroyed most government capacity, such
as Iraq and Afghanistan, stability operations may address some of the state institutions
closely involved with or impacting upon economic growth. However, most of the issues
will be under the direction of a country team led by the U.S. Ambassador (or in the rare
case, the U.S. Administrator). It is beyond the scope of this guide to discuss monetary
and fiscal policies or specific strategies for restoring an institution such as the central
bank. The discussion of issues, tradeoffs, and options below focuses on issues within the
purview of military and civilian personnel engaged in stability operations.
Enabling environment issues. Four arenas in which government, both central and
regional/local, needs to intervene to provide an enabling environment for sustainable
economic growth are discussed elsewhere in other sections of this guide or in a companion
guide, Restoring Governance.16 They are (1) efficient provision of basic routine services; (2)
rehabilitation and repair and/or construction of public infrastructure; (3) rule of law as
applicable to commercial transactions and protection of property; and, (4) security as it
relates to protection of business assets from theft or destruction.
The previous discussion of efficient provision of basic services highlighted how
improving individual citizen’s/household’s access to services has the potential for
reducing tension, preventing the restart of conflict, or redressing inequities of the
previous regime. Restoration of basic services also contributes to enabling economic
activity. Businesses, both micro and large-scale, also require access to services. The
cement industry, for example, consumes large quantities of electricity and requires water
in the production process. Household farms that generate a surplus beyond household
needs for sale to generate monetary income require markets in which to display and sell
their goods, as well as transportation routes from rural areas to market towns or urban
centers. Tanning, fabric dyeing, and other materials preparation processes require large
quantities of water and a means of disposal of hazardous or toxic wastes.
Thus immediate attention to restoration of basic services to households during
stability operations, as discussed earlier, also must take into account the quantity and
quality requirements of existing or potential economic enterprises. Reliability of service is
particularly important to small businesses that are unlikely to be able to afford a private
alternative. For example, food distribution and retail food establishments that require
refrigeration need a reliable/predictable electricity supply. Erratic electricity or water
supply that may be an annoying inconvenience to households could be destructive to
small businesses. Larger enterprises may be able to substitute private supply for public
service delivery—for example, purchase and use of generators—but that increases the
cost of doing business and may discourage enterprises from reopening rapidly after a
period of conflict.
The same issues arise if the cause of inadequate quality or quantity of services is
not routine operations but is inadequate infrastructure. Decisions by S&R actors about
capital investments in infrastructure, or support for the host government’s allocation of
capital investment resources, must take into account the potential impacts on existing
as well as start-up enterprises. Analysis of the potential economic base for a region or
town may identify transportation advantages, access to critical natural resources in
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the immediate area, or availability of a skilled workforce in particular trades that have
been idled by conflict or disaster. Businesses can take advantage of these assets if smallscale infrastructure improvements are made. Thus, stability operations interventions to
improve services provision and/or to improve the infrastructure base also can support
more rapid startup or restart of enterprises that depend upon public services.
In addition to direct service delivery, the state’s ability to establish and ensure the
rule of law also has a significant impact on economic growth possibilities. In cases of
prolonged conflict, it is highly likely that private capital assets have been converted
to financial assets to the maximum extent possible and taken out of the country, or,
in the case of smaller quantities of financial assets, hidden away. These private assets
may be redeployed rapidly under the right conditions as conflict ends, but if there is
considerable uncertainty over whether commercial contracts can be enforced or other
legal protections for commercial transactions will be available, then capital will be slow
to return to the country or the area of conflict. Hence, restoring some degree of certainty
in how commercial transactions and contracts will be protected and enforced is necessary
to induce those with capital to restart enterprises or to engage in new economic activities.
Where the legal system is in significant disarray, stability operations personnel may work
with local officials to take advantage of traditional sources of dispute resolution such as
councils of elders or tribal councils to play a role in resolving commercial and property
disputes.
One useful tool in identifying the various obstacles and barriers to restarting economic
activity and/or stimulating new entrepreneurial activity is an index developed by the
World Bank that summarizes the facilitating factors for doing business, based on a large
number of indicators grouped into 10 categories. Box 16 is a summary description of the
categories in the index and the main individual components.17 Stability operations, unless
they continue over a multiyear timeframe, will not be able to address many of these
issues. For example, the minimum paid-in capital required to establish a limited liability
company to conduct a business is typically embedded in the commercial code of the

Box 16. World Bank Ease of Doing Business Index.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Starting a business: Procedures, time, cost and paid-in minimum capital to open a new business .
Dealing with construction permits: Procedures, time and cost to obtain construction permits,
inspections and utility connections .
Employing workers: Difficulty of hiring index, rigidity of hours of index, difficulty of firing index,
firing cost.
Registering property: Procedures, time and cost to transfer commercial real estate .
Getting credit: Strength of legal rights index, depth of credit information index.
Protecting investors: Strength of investor protection index, extent of disclosure index, extent of
director liability index, and ease of shareholder suits index.
Paying taxes: Number of tax payments, time to prepare and file tax returns and to pay taxes, total
taxes as share of profit before all taxes borne.
Trading across borders: Documents, time and cost to export and import .
Enforcing contracts: Procedures, time and cost to resolve a commercial dispute.
Closing a business: Recovery rate in bankruptcy.
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country’s legal system. External actors such as S&R operations personnel are not likely to
become engaged with commercial code revisions. But many of the other issues identified
in Box 16 are managed (or mismanaged) at the local level. Stability operations may
promote activities to speed up commercial requirements such as securing construction
permits and conduct of inspections.
Finally, the enabling environment is affected by safety and security issues. Security
issues include the obvious—a small- or large-scale insurgency, criminal activity, and lack
of order and safety. Security issues for economic enterprises also include the behavior of
security personnel themselves. Having to pay bribes for police protection for a business
establishment, or to civil servants to obtain permits and licenses, or to pass inspections can
be issues for stability operations interventions. In particular, micro and small enterprises
that operate on very thin margins cannot afford the extra costs of doing business stemming
from lawlessness or from the corrupt behavior of security personnel.
Direct economic interventions issues. Several categories of governmental activity relate
directly to the economy and economic growth:
• Employment generation
• Access to capital for small entrepreneurs
• Role and management of state-owned enterprises
• Banking system and transactions
• Macro-economic (fiscal and monetary) policy
• External trade (exports and imports).
It is beyond the scope of this guide to recommend specific economic policies. For
example, control of the money supply and exchange rate issues is critical to an economy’s
ability to enter, or reenter, competition in the global economy. However, strengthening
the capacity of the finance ministry and the central bank and advising on major policy
issues are well beyond the scope of stability operations to rebuild government. Advisors
from the U.S. Department of Treasury, International Monetary Fund, World Bank, USAID,
and other bilateral foreign assistance agencies may be involved in policy dialogue and
institutional strengthening; and individual military reservists with significant civilian
expertise in these areas may very well be engaged in such institutional strengthening
and policy dialogue activities. However, the last three bulleted issues listed above are not
addressed here except to note that a complete economic reform program would entail
support and assistance in all of these areas. This program may operate in parallel with
the latter phases of stability operations in some cases, or in parallel from the immediate
post-conflict intervention in cases of complete state collapse.
Public institutions, and particularly local governments, and stability operations,
however, are regularly involved in specific interventions in the first three areas listed:
employment generation, finance for small and micro-entrepreneurs, and state-owned
enterprises. Large scale unemployment and underemployment are characteristic of
post-conflict settings. Public services and infrastructure facilities are likely to have been
disrupted, preventing the restart of business activity. Security will still be an issue in
many cases. In this environment, entrepreneurs can be expected to be reluctant to commit
capital to buying much inventory for resale, or to rebuilding or constructing new business
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facilities or small manufacturing enterprises. Previous combatants that have demobilized
will add to the swelling of the un- and underemployed.
Public services rehabilitation and repair projects are one of the most immediate and
obvious employment opportunities. Use of stability operations funds to employ workers
for a wide range of public improvements from trash collection to drainage clean out to
road repair and so forth is commonplace, and a useful strategy. It is important, however,
to avoid two common mistakes: (1) use of uniformed military personnel to perform the
service when there is plenty of local labor, however badly the service is needed, and (2)
working apart from, rather than in concert with, local government or local departments
of central government agencies or civil society organizations.
The use of U.S. (or other partner nations’) military personnel is tempting because the
personnel with the equipment are on the ground and desire to do something constructive
to improve citizens’ conditions. A U.S. Army division commander during the occupation
period in Iraq remarked that he “commanded a division of over 21,000 men and women
with all of the equipment that entails, and could do pretty much anything that needed
doing to clean up and fix up the area of operations.” That division commander recognized,
however, that his job was not to restore services, but to restore the ability of the Iraqis to
restore services, and acted accordingly.
Similarly, it is tempting to start a direct employment program in which unemployed
youth are hired for various public works activities, paid with U.S. Government funds
but with no connection to any host government entity. That may well be the only choice
very early in stability operations if no functional government institutions exist in the
area of operations. However, as rapidly as possible, stability operations personnel need
to connect with host government actors and civil society organizations to coordinate
such employment programs. Stability operations personnel should credit as much as
possible host country actors with the ideas, the supervision, and the choice of priority
projects in which the unemployed will be engaged. This approach is more complicated
and time-consuming than “doing it yourself,” but it pays dividends in starting to restore
confidence in, and build the legitimacy of, the state and the new government. It certainly
does not imply that one must pass the funds to a host government official who in turn
pays the temporary workforce. That may be an unacceptable use of U.S. funds, or—even
if legal—it may create opportunities for corruption when initially U.S. funds may be the
only source of hard currency around.
Having the only currency available also may mean that the use of S&R funds is the
sole ready means to provide small scale loans to local entrepreneurs to rebuild their
inventory, or to repair damaged small business facilities, or to purchase minor capital
equipment. Typical development programs from USAID or other donor organizations
when the environment is reasonably permissive include financial resources to jump start
or restart commercial activities. Uniformed personnel already familiar with the area may
already have identified individuals who previously had small businesses that cannot
reopen for lack of capital. Military and civilian cooperation to bring opportunity and
capital together is a win/win strategy for a whole-of-government approach.
Finally, one of the thornier issues in the government’s direct role in the economy is how
to address the role of state-owned enterprises. In virtually every country where stability
operations are likely, there will be more government entities carrying out what Western
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industrial countries would consider private sector business activities. For example, in
Iraq before 2003, as much as 80 percent of all employment was public sector employment.
National petroleum companies, telecommunications companies, and airlines are obvious
and visible. But state-owned enterprises also include cement factories, manufacturing
plants for hard goods, and agricultural inputs such as seeds and fertilizers. Many of these
state-owned enterprises are likely in the pre-conflict period not to have been competitive
without significant government subsidies. These enterprises were unlikely to have been
able to recover both capital and operating costs, much less return any kind of profit
(whether called profit or not) on capital. Without protection against foreign competition
in the form of either tariffs to raise the price of foreign products or of input subsidies
to lower the apparent cost of production, these enterprises are likely not to have been
competitive if the pre-conflict economy was substantially dominated by the state.
The dilemma is that these enterprises likely were major sources of employment, in
addition to government civil service in the more traditional governmental institutions
involved in regulatory or public service provision roles. If those state-owned enterprises
are not restarted, it is highly likely that unemployment will remain high, perhaps for
years, before competitive new enterprises can take their place. On the other hand, if the
noncompetitive state-owned enterprises are restarted to operate as before, it is likely that
they will remain a drag on long-term, sustainable economic growth. Both the USAID and
UNDP documents referred to in Box 15 reach somewhat similar conclusions:
• Encourage selling the assets of smaller state-owned enterprises right away;
• Reform the larger state-owned enterprises to achieve competitive position; and,
• Engage in policy dialogue activities to persuade the government of the advantages
of getting government out of most economic sectors and businesses that are
demonstrably more competitive as privately owned enterprises in neighboring
countries within the region.
Trade-offs.
Short-term versus long-term. Restoring or rebuilding government’s role in support of
economic growth is especially replete with short-term vs. long-term tradeoffs. As noted
above, in post-conflict situations, economic activities have in many cases come to a
complete halt. Emergency relief and humanitarian assistance services provide a quick,
but short-lived jump-start to economic activity. Even modest employment for emergency
shelter construction; to assist in emergency food and water distribution; and to assist
in organizing temporary health facilities, child care facilities, or temporary schools for
children will put some money into circulation.
Somewhat larger-scale activities beyond the immediate emergency relief such as
discussed above—trash collection, drainage clearance, etc.—also put money back into
circulation. Similarly, paying for informal community watch or community security
forces in the absence of government security personnel addresses some security issues
and puts money into circulation.
However, all of these are temporary short-term measures; only those jobs created that
ultimately are absorbed by private sector growth or by government—the latter especially
in the case of informal community police—will be sustainable. In the long term, S&R
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operations will have ceased, and even subsequent development programs will not focus
on continuing short-term temporary employment activities. In the long-term, the roles of
the private sector and government have to be sorted out. The preponderance of evidence
shows that private sector-led economic activity has to increase if a country is to develop
an economy that is unlikely to be a source or cause of conflict and is likely to provide
enough incentives for most of the population to eschew violence. Similarly, where local
informal security forces are being paid by U.S. or other donor sources, it is essential that
there be agreement with the host country about the long-term absorption of those forces
into the regular police or other security forces.
Efficiency versus effectiveness in public infrastructure investment. In the previous discussion
on long-term planning and capital investment strategies, the focus was on restoration
of services to citizens and to support economic activity. An additional consideration
in stability operations is the long-term economic viability of infrastructure investment
choices. The issue is not whether or not to invest so as to provide basic services, water
supply for example. Rather, the concern is taking into account the economic implications
of choice of technology, choice of capital financing mechanisms, and choice of cost
recovery mechanisms, including the role of user or beneficiary charges. As noted in
the earlier discussion of capital investment financing, the most common way to finance
infrastructure in developing countries is for central government to finance both capital
and recurring operating costs from the central government annual budget. In some cases
where responsibility has been devolved to local governments, the most likely financing
mechanisms are capital costs financed from the central government budget and annually
recurring costs recovered from the local government budget, which in most cases means
through direct charges to water supply users.
Financing from the central government budget without subsequent user or beneficiary
charges for ongoing costs is expedient. Central governments often borrow from
multilateral institutions such as the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank for major
infrastructure construction projects. These large-scale, loan-financed projects are subject
to rigorous financial and economic cost analysis to ensure that the economic benefits of
the investment—meaning the gain in value in the overall economy—are greater than
the cost. However, in implementation numerous problems arise, particularly in conflictaffected countries. As noted in the discussion of provision of basic services, routine
maintenance and repair are often neglected. The full life span of the capital investment
is never realized because the infrastructure fails well before the end of its designed life
cycle. In that case, the economy no longer benefits from the capital facility, but the central
government is still repaying interest and capital on the original loan financing.
The alternative involves choosing technology, level of service, and level of quality
whose costs can be recovered through charges to the users of the service. This promotes
long-term economic efficiency, but the tradeoff is likely to be a level and type of service
that citizens may feel is substandard compared with what they may be familiar with in the
capital city, in upper income areas, or in higher income economies nearby. Citizens may
view the service as less effective than what they would have expected, which affects their
perception of the social contract with the state. Stability operations cannot really address
this issue, with a major exception. Where stability operations involve financial support
for capital investment in infrastructure, the trade-off is often between unsustainable
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long-term costs with significant cost to the central government budget, and choices that
provide a service that can be afforded by the population.
Options.
Maximize the use of host country institutions, including state and civil society organizations,
and traditional structures to facilitate and manage short-term employment programs. Design
economic stimulus interventions that are also primarily job generation activities to aid
in the task of rebuilding government and identify and use existing social groups and
organizations to work with whatever state institutions exist in the conflict/post-conflict
setting to select priorities for various public works improvements. Use these institutions
to communicate employment opportunities to the un- and underemployed, to mobilize
a workforce, and to oversee the conduct of the work. Employment generating activities
have several good motivations: taking unemployed youth off the streets for security
reasons, giving people an initial sense of hope, putting currency into circulation, and
achieving a public good. They also strengthen the credibility and legitimacy of the state,
and encourage dialogue between local government officials and citizens.
Favor lower technology solutions and a focus on tools and supplies to repair and rehabilitate
existing public infrastructure and facilities over major capital projects. The previously discussed
reasons for this recommended option focused on strengthening the capacity of local
officials to “do the job themselves,” providing tools, materials, and supplies that enable
local personnel to diagnose and fix the problems. Here the stress is on limiting the negative
impact of higher cost solutions that might be unaffordable if the country had to pay for
the solutions themselves. Higher cost technologies that are affordable only because they
are paid for by S&R funds generate future cost requirements for maintaining or replacing
that technology. These are not likely to be affordable when the external funds are no longer
available. In addition, technology solutions selected by external parties may not be fully
compatible with existing technology and may result in some new facilities never being
put into use, thereby generating hostility in the population for a service not delivered and
wasted S&R resources.
Undertake economic and financial analyses of what the long-run capital recovery and operating
costs would be, and what users or government budgets would have to pay. The time frame for
stability operations is typically too short for significant policy changes to be made in cost
recovery systems for public infrastructure. If user charges are not customary, for water,
for example, then it is highly unlikely that during the course of stability operations a
change to user cost recovery can be implemented. However, prior to making specific
decisions involving the use of S&R funds for potential capital investments, there should
be a “what if” analysis to consider how high user charges would have to be to recover
only recurring costs and how high these charges would have to be to recover both capital
costs and recurring costs. In general, S&R capital investment decisions should be taken
with a view that the country will shift to cost recovery through user charges during the
life cycle of the capital investment. The S&R decision should reflect what is likely to be
affordable. This exercise may seem speculative when that shift in the country’s approach
to financing capital investments might take place, but the discipline of considering the
options will result in better uses of S&R funds and a more economically efficient impact
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on the economy. Further, full engagement with host country personnel in the disciplined
analytic process will enhance their decisionmaking capacity.
Support local government, or local offices of central ministries, to build government capacity
to facilitate small business rehabilitation and local economic growth. The World Bank’s Ease of
Doing Business index referenced in Box 16 provides a useful list of the possible obstacles
small businesses face in starting up or restarting. A quick assessment of how many
steps it takes to register a small business legally (obtain permits for even modest facility
improvements, get inspections scheduled and conducted, register for tax payments [if
such payments are part of a tax system in the specific country], register with or become
part of the social insurance system, which is likely to be a mandatory step, etc.) is likely
to reveal that it could take several months to be fully compliant. One-stop business startup centers established locally with representatives of all of the local government and
central government agencies whose permission and/or cooperation is necessary to start
and operate a business in one place is a useful way to speed up the process. Employment
and job training centers can complement business centers by sharing information on
labor supply and demand, and business opportunities. Box 17 provides an example of
the creation of such centers in Iraq.18
Box 17. Local Government Support for Economic Development:
Kirkuk Business and Employment Centers.
USAID supported programs to build local government capacity to create enabling conditions for
local economic development in Iraq. These programs combined support to improve the institutional
environment for economic development, identify and exploit key economic opportunities, invest in
strategic infrastructure, and involve stakeholders in local economic development policy decisions. Local authorities were assisted to work with citizens and local businesses.
In Tameem Province, this program led to the establishment of four centers: the Employment Services Center, which provided a mechanism for registering unemployed workers and placing them into
jobs suited to their skills and experience; the Kirkuk Business Center, which promoted private business
development and investment throughout the province; the Kirkuk Vocational Training Center, which
trained or retrained workers in the skills required in the post-war economy; and the Project Coordination Center, which brought local officials and citizens together for integrated development planning.
These four centers functioned in a coordinated and collaborative manner. The results were increased
citizen participation, improved conditions that generated 12,000 jobs, and institutionalization of the
centers into local government.

CONCLUSIONS
		Rebuilding public sector services in stability operations takes place in a wide variety
of settings ranging from emergency responses to catastrophic natural and/or manmade
disruptions of service, and in societies with no functioning government to a government
more or less accepted as the legitimate government. Stability operations as defined in
Field Manual (FM) 3-07 are more likely in the extreme cases of severe disruption, either
country-wide or an entire region within a country and weakly functioning government,
at least in the affected region. Stability operations consist of two types—reconstruction
and stabilization.
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		Reconstruction activities typically address the immediate issues. They involve the
process of rebuilding degraded, damaged or destroyed infrastructure—both physical and
political or socio-economic. Most measures initially taken in reconstruction are restorative,
remedying immediate problems. Stabilization activities are aimed at underlying
problems that are often linked to conflict, either the causes or the consequences of conflict.
Stabilization operations aim to enhance the preconditions for longer-term development.
		Both reconstruction and stabilization activities insofar as possible, once emergency
issues have been addressed, should be carried out with a longer-term view of how the
activities will affect future development of the system of governance and the economy.
Public service restoration is carried out unavoidably in conjunction with the existing public
authorities, except in the extreme case of complete collapse of the regime. Public service
restoration, while focused on the technical tasks of getting public services delivered, has
important implications for the legitimacy of public authorities. It is important as much as
possible to credit public authority with successes in public services restoration. The task
is not to win acclaim for stability operations personnel in the society, but to contribute to
as rapid a restoration of public authority as is possible.
		At the same time, as immediate service delivery issues are addressed, stability
operations may move into more systemic improvement in the governance system,
engaging with existing or new authority just assuming their responsibilities to develop
participatory processes to gain the support of citizens. Similarly, introducing improved
planning and budgeting processes, focusing on long-term capital budgeting and financing,
and skills development of local authority personnel in operation and maintenance may
be a focus of stabilization activities once immediate and emergency issues are resolved.
		Finally, stability operations are a part of a longer-term spectrum in which in the ideal
public order is restored, the conditions that may have given rise to conflict or may in the
future are ameliorated, improved practices and skills are introduced to public authorities
responsible for services, and the foundations are set for long-term, sustainable development
of the society. Specific activities in public services restoration should take into account the
impact they may have on the desired outcomes in this longer-term spectrum.
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